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ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY RACE RELATIONS/EQUAL OPPORT--ETC(U)

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ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY RACE RELATIONS/ EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TRAINING PROGRAM: SUMMARY REPORT

by

Peter G. Nordlie
Human Sciences and Research, Inc.
7710 Old Springhouse Road
McLean, Virginia 22101

and

James A. Thomas
Army Research Institute Field Unit
Presidio of Monterey, California

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
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ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY RACE RELATIONS/EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TRAINING PROGRAM: SUMMARY REPORT

BRIEF

Requirement:

To summarize and discuss conclusions drawn for six separate reports analyzing Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Training in the Army. These six reports examine RR/EO training provided by CONUS at unit level, Korea at unit level, USAREUR at unit level, an experimental training program, Army service and professional schools, and Defense Race Relations Institute (DRRI). The objectives of the total study were to analyze and describe RR/EO training conducted in the Army, and to assess the impact of that training.

Procedure:

The study was carried out between the summer of 1976 and the end of 1977. Research teams visited a total of nine installations in CONUS, eight in USAREUR, and one in Korea. Data were obtained by survey questionnaires, by individual and group interviews, and by observation. Survey questionnaire data were obtained from a 40 percent random sample of 184 companies, giving a total N of about 7,350. Group or individual interviews were held with: brigade commanders; battalion commanders; company commanders; senior enlisted NCOs; junior enlisted personnel; RR/EO staff officers or NCOs; and graduates of DRRI. In addition, interviews were held with faculty members and students at DRRI, USAREUR Race Relations School, the U.S. Army War College, the Command and General Staff College, the Infantry School, and eight other service schools. Questionnaire data were also collected from members of 41 companies involved in an experimental RR/EO training program at three different locations in CONUS.

Findings:

Objectively, there have been marked reductions in measures of institutional racial discrimination on many dimensions, as for example, the relative speed of promotion of white and non-white enlisted personnel. These positive trends appear to be continuing. On the other hand, the picture regarding attitudes and perceptions is less encouraging and reflects a different trend. The improvement in racial attitudes and perceptions, which had been evident in the 1972 to 1974 period, stopped by 1976. Despite the low frequency of overt interracial violence, race-related tensions persist and appear to be increasing. A new source of race related tensions

Down

has become evident and appears to be growing in magnitude and strength. Whereas it was once primarily the frustration and bitterness of minorities which provided the fuel for racial tensions, the new source of tensions is the anger of an increasing number of whites who see themselves as being victimized by what they perceive as 'reverse discrimination.'

There were two major problems with RR/EO unit training documented in the study. First, not more than half of the training required by the regulations is actually given. Second, where the training is being given, it is frequently of low quality and often relates to race relations or equal opportunity in name only--the subject matter being far removed or only tangentially related.

In regard to RR/EO training in Army schools, RR/EO instruction was considered a low priority subject matter and was only reluctantly incorporated into course curricula. Only a few of the schools had implemented the Uniform Service School Standards for Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Instruction which had been issued by TRADOC nine months previously. RR/EO courses in the schools were generally not taught by RR/EO-qualified instructors and the training was still largely oriented toward creating awareness.

There is a need to rethink EO doctrine and to formulate a more comprehensive, coherent and articulated statement of doctrine which clearly interrelates the various components of the program.

The Army needs to prepare Army leaders, including SR NCOs, to carry out their EO responsibilities and provide commanders with the tools they need to do it.

A whole new approach to EO education and training should be developed and substituted for the current approach.

The Army should take the essential steps needed to be taken to increase the credibility of the EO education and training program.

For the EO training program to exist and be effective, it must become part of the normal and routine mode of operation in the Army. It must be built in to all practices and procedures through which the Army makes judgments about personnel. Equality of opportunity and interracial harmony need to become the norm in all Army activities.

Utilization:

This research provided the Army with a comprehensive analysis of the status and impact of the Army's Equal Opportunity/Training Program. While technical reports relate to the Army as a whole, installation

feedback reports on unit training were provided commanders of the data collection sites. Results of this research, therefore, should be instrumental not only in improving the operational effectiveness of the program but from the policy viewpoint.

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**ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY
RACE RELATIONS/EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TRAINING PROGRAM:
SUMMARY REPORT**

I. INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes and discusses conclusions drawn from six separate reports of a study of Race Relations/Equal Opportunity (RR/EO)¹ Training in the Army. These six reports examined RR/EO training provided by:

- CONUS at unit level;
- Korea at unit level;
- USAREUR at unit level;
- an experimental training program;
- Army service and professional schools; and
- Defense Race Relations Institute (DRRI).

The study was carried out between the summer of 1976 and the end of 1977. Research teams visited a total of nine installations in CONUS, eight in USAREUR, and one in Korea. Data were obtained by survey questionnaires, by individual and group interviews and by observation. Survey questionnaire data were obtained from a 40 percent random sample of 184 companies, giving a total N of about 7,350. Group or individual interviews were held with: brigade commanders; battalion commanders; company commanders; senior enlisted NCO's; junior enlisted personnel; RR/EO staff officers or NCO's; and graduates of DRRI. In addition, interviews were held with faculty members and students at DRRI, USAREUR Race Relations School, the U.S. Army War College, the Command and General Staff College, the Infantry School, and eight other service schools. Questionnaire data were also collected from members of 41 companies involved in an experimental RR/EO training program at three different locations in CONUS.

The objectives of the total study were to:

- Analyze and describe the RR/EO training being conducted in the Army.
- Assess the impact of that training.

¹The new AR 600-21 changed the name to the Equal Opportunity Program (EO). Since the program's name was RR/EO for most of this study, that is the term most frequently used in this report.

The detailed findings and specific conclusions of the different parts of the study are found in the six separate reports listed below.

Robert L. Hiett and Peter G. Nordlie. *An Analysis of the Unit Race Relations Training Program in the U.S. Army*. McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc., 1976.

William S. Edmonds and Peter G. Nordlie. *Analysis of Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Training in Korea*. McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc., 1977.

Marcia A. Gilbert and Peter G. Nordlie. *An Analysis of Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Training in USAREUR*. McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc., 1978.

Robert L. Hiett. *Analysis of Experimental Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Training*. McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, 1977.

William S. Edmonds and Peter G. Nordlie. *Analysis of Individual Race Relations and Equal Opportunity Training in Army Schools*. McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc., 1977.

Byron G. Fiman, Ph.D. *An Analysis of the Training of Army Personnel at the Defense Race Relations Institute*. McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc., 1977.

This particular report summarizes and synthesizes the conclusions from the other reports and provides an interpretation of these conclusions with respect to their potential implications for RR/EO training in the Army.

II. OVERALL STATE OF RACE RELATIONS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE ARMY

Since 1970, the Army has been engaged in a program aimed at improving race relations and ensuring equal opportunity in all activities of the Army. This has probably been the largest sustained programmatic effort ever undertaken by any organization for these purposes. What can now be said about the effects the program has had? What has changed in the Army? What is the racial climate in the Army and how has it changed? Is actual racial discrimination in the Army declining? What can be learned from nearly seven years of experience with the program? These are some of the questions addressed by the study.

The RR/EO program was conceived and initiated in response to violent eruptions and confrontations between whites and blacks at almost every major Army installation in CONUS and overseas in 1969 and 1970. The combat readiness of the Army could not help but be seriously and adversely affected by the racial tensions, the low morale among substantial numbers of Army personnel, and the general failure in communications across racial lines which had developed in the Army at that time. The original RR/EO policies, doctrines, programs and subsequent modifications have been aimed at altering that state of affairs in order to remove racial tension as a factor degrading the ability of the Army to perform its primary mission.

The racial situation in the Army in 1977 is clearly much different from what it was in the 1969-1970 period. Many changes have occurred, and while the extent to which they have been the direct result of the RR/EO training programs cannot be precisely determined, the training program most clearly has contributed to those changes. Interracial confrontation and physical violence on a large scale have nearly disappeared. Inasmuch as the non-white population of the Army has approximately doubled since 1970, the near elimination of violent confrontation has come during a period when the opportunity for white/non-white interactions to occur has steadily increased. Objectively, there have been

attitudes and perceptions between whites and blacks in the Army with respect to RR/EO issues, the white population itself is showing increasing signs of polarizing into two roughly equal-sized camps with distinctly different views.

In the late Sixties, the race problem in the Army was highly visible and prominent in the form of riots and a high frequency of violent, race-related incidents. That high visibility and the tangible nature of the problem has changed. The race problem in the Army today has low visibility and few obvious indicators. If one believed that the severity of the race problem is measured by the frequency of overt racial incidents, then one would probably conclude that a race problem no longer exists in the Army, and this was the view expressed by many commanders interviewed in this study. It is a primary conclusion of the study, however, that this is not the case. *While race-related tensions now seldom erupt into violent confrontations, the tensions still remain.*

Several factors contribute to this phenomenon. First, minorities are more reluctant to take direct action than they once were, having learned that the cost of so doing, at least for the individual involved, tended to be high. Second, whites are less likely to precipitate direct action than they once may have been because they also are more aware of the adverse consequences. Third, because of the emphasis that has been placed on RR/EO issues, leaders are extremely reluctant to allow anything that can be labelled as a "racial incident" to surface in any records or reports. All of these factors combine to reduce the likelihood of: (1) race-related violent incidents occurring; and (2) being reported when they do occur. These factors do not, however, have any similar effect on *reducing* existing racial tensions.

It is a conclusion of this study that racial tensions are very much present and may be increasing in the Army today. They are not very visible, however, because it appears as if an "*interracial détente*" exists wherein both whites and non-whites have tacitly agreed to avoid fanning the sparks that could ignite the tinderbox of suppressed interracial tensions. The tinderbox, however, is still there.

III. RR/EO TRAINING IN THE ARMY

Race relations/equal opportunity training was introduced into Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the NCO Education System, and Basic Combat Training in 1970, and, although much modified, remains in those courses today. In 1972, 18 hours of unit training annually in RR/EO became mandatory for all Army units. Although modified several times, RR/EO unit training is still mandatory for most of the Army.

The Army, the second largest federal organization in American society, has mounted and sustained the largest RR/EO training program ever undertaken aimed at improving race relations and ensuring equal opportunity in all the activities of the organization. The Army has also undertaken research for the purpose of studying how the program was working and how it could be more effective. If it is possible to be critical of the Army's program, it is only because the Army has continued to study itself and obtain data which is largely lacking for most other organizations. If we are able to conclude, as we do conclude, that there are major and severe problems with the training program, it is only because the Army has had the fortitude to examine its own programs and the courage to make public the results. This contrasts sharply with the more frequently encountered approach of papering over deficiencies in such programs, publicizing how much effort goes into the program, and steadfastly proclaiming that the program is achieving what it was intended to achieve although offering no hard evidence in support of the claim.

There were two major problems with RR/EO unit training documented in the study. First, not more than half of the training required by the regulations is actually given. Second, where the training is being given, it is frequently of low quality and often relates to race relations or equal opportunity in name only—the subject matter being far removed or only tangentially related.

A key problem for RR/EO unit training resulted from the 1974 revision of AR 600-42 which placed the responsibility for conducting RR/EO unit training on the chain of command. This change had the effect of placing the responsibility for RR/EO

training in the hands of those who have had the least preparation in how to do it, and removing it from the hands of those who had had the maximum preparation—DRRI graduates—who, for the most part, are doing very little training. There was much evidence that as carried out by company commanders, unit training was a very low priority matter and largely a "paper program."

Another critical issue is that RR/EO unit training is reaching the level of E5's and below but is definitely not reaching all levels as the policy and doctrine intended and required. It appears that E6's and above tend to successfully evade RR/EO unit training. Thus, leaders, who by virtue of their role in the organization have the most power to effect change are the least likely to participate in the unit training.

It appears that there is more RR/EO training occurring in USAREUR than in CONUS or Korea, but the amount appears to be declining under the new FY 77 program. On the other hand, the second component of the USAREUR FY 77 program, the 12-hour Community-Level Orientation Course conducted by DRRI or URRS graduates, appears to be the most effective block of instruction of its type encountered during this study. RR/EO training in Korea appeared quite similar to that conducted in CONUS although the sessions are held somewhat less frequently than in CONUS. Race-related tensions at the one location surveyed in Korea were the highest of all locations studied.

In one part of the study, experimental RR/EO unit training was established on three installations to test the effects of a number of specific variables on training effectiveness. The experiment was not entirely successful primarily because of the uncertainty about how much of the experimental training actually occurred. But this outcome was important in itself because it suggested that if under ideal conditions, where everyone involved had been briefed and checked out, where lesson plans were provided, and where the company commanders involved knew their units were in the experiment and were going to be tested—if under these ideal conditions, the training still did not occur as required, then there must be something wrong with the basic concept on which unit RR/EO training is built.

The Army's RR/EO education and training program calls for training in Army schools as well as unit training in all units. Overall, there appears to have been far more emphasis on RR/EO *unit* training than on *individual* training in the schools. It was concluded from the study of RR/EO training in Army schools that on the whole, RR/EO instruction was considered a low priority subject matter and was only reluctantly incorporated into course curricula. Only a few of the schools had implemented the *Uniform Service School Standards for Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Instruction* which had been issued by TRADOC nine months previously. RR/EO courses in the schools were generally not taught by RR/EO-qualified instructors and the training was still largely oriented toward creating awareness. There had been little progress in tailoring training courses to specific job needs of students. Staff and faculty of schools tended to view RR/EO training as an unwanted orphan thrust upon them—a low priority, directionless program. There is an increasing demand by school faculty and staffs to eliminate RR/EO instruction given as a *block* of instruction and to split up the content and incorporate it into other blocks of instruction dealing with leadership and personnel. RR/EO training in Army schools gives no evidence of being vigorously implemented by a coherent approach which faculty, staff, and students find meaningful and useful. This means that an important opportunity for individual education and training regarding many aspects of RR/EO, especially as it concerns leaders is being lost. With so little individual RR/EO education and training occurring in the schools, the entire burden of RR/EO training is by default laid on unit training, a task for which unit training alone is not equal. Most clearly, unit training is an appropriate locus for only some parts of the total RR/EO education and training task. An effective RR/EO education and training program will require a more balanced division of labor between school training and unit training.

IV. CRITICAL ISSUES AND POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS

During the period that the Army has had a RR/EO training program, racial violence in the Army has declined, measures of some important dimensions of institutional racial discrimination have shown marked reductions, and minorities, in general, have acknowledged that there have been considerable improvements in race relations and equal opportunity. It is not possible to know just how many of these changes can be attributed to the existence of the training program, but it seems reasonable that the training played a role in encouraging and facilitating the movement toward the reduction in racial discrimination. But, even if one judges it to have been effective to some extent, there is still the question of how much more effective can it be made and, in particular, how cost effective can it be made? Can similar results be obtained with smaller but more efficient and effective efforts? The efficiency or cost effectiveness question is of special importance at a time when the minority composition of the Army is increasing while the overall size of the Army is decreasing and the resources available for RR/EO programs are continuously vulnerable as the result of stiffening competition for the more and more limited resources. In addition, there is the question of how much the situation has changed compared with the situation that existed when the program was first promulgated and subsequently modified and how such changes may imply new requirements.

In this section, we pinpoint the critical issues that appeared to emerge from the findings and our experiences in the total study, and suggest some of the changes in the program that the Army may wish to consider making which would be aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the total program.

RR/EO Policy and Doctrine

The most current policy statement on RR/EO—AR 600-21—appears to provide an appropriate and adequate foundation for the program. It is at the level of doctrine that certain problems and lack a lack of clarity emerge. Doctrine is understood here as being the

fundamental principles guiding the achievement of the objectives specified by policy. Doctrine is the analytical expression of policy into specific task and program terms. Doctrine represents, at any moment, the best thought available as to *how* policy should be carried out.

EO³ policy states that the Equal Opportunity Program in the Army is a single program with two equal and complementary components: Affirmative Actions and Education and Training. While that part is clear, it is not clear how education and training are to contribute to achievement of EO objectives. How does increased awareness lead to decreases in discrimination and increases in racial harmony? How does training contribute to affirmative actions objectives? What different kinds of training are needed at different levels in the organization to ensure achievement of the diverse objectives? These are the kinds of questions for which current doctrine is inadequate. It is inadequate because there is no statement of how the different elements of the program are interrelated; there is no overall concept or model which unifies and makes coherent the many diverse elements of the program.

One conclusion from this study is that there is a need to rethink EO doctrine and to formulate a more comprehensive, coherent and articulated statement of doctrine which clearly interrelates the various components of the program. The policy statement itself appears adequate and the descriptions of the component programs are, at least, clear. What is missing, however, is an explicit concept of how they all tie together to achieve the policy goals.

Preparing Chain-of-Command Personnel

Army policy places the responsibility for both components of the EO program squarely and unequivocally on the chain of command. It further specifies that, in addition to entry-level training and unit training, individual education for *Army leaders, managers, and supervisors* will be institutionalized throughout the Army school system at all levels.

³With the issuance of AR 600-21 in September 1977, the name of the program was changed from RR/EO to the Equal Opportunity Program (EO). In referring to this new policy, we will use the abbreviation EO instead of RR/EO.

It is a conclusion from this study that most of the failings, problems, and inadequacies of the RR/EO education and training program stem directly from the fact that chain-of-command personnel have *not* been adequately prepared to carry out the responsibility with which they have been charged. The single greatest lack in the whole program has been the overall failure to educate and prepare Army leaders. With respect to their views of the EO program, we characterized Army leaders, especially at the company commander level, as being:

- (a) uncertain of its objectives;
- (b) distrustful of its intent;
- (c) unconvinced of its importance;
- (d) untrained with respect to its content; and
- (e) uncomfortable with the subject matter.

To the extent this characterization is accurate, it should help account for why the RR/EO training may be less than fully effective in most instances, and, indeed, in some instances, counterproductive. No matter what else is true of the program, until the chain of command is adequately prepared to carry out its RR/EO responsibilities, the program cannot be expected to achieve its objectives. Indeed, if we were limited to one single recommendation on how to make the EO program more effective, it would have to be: *Prepare Army leaders to carry out their EO responsibilities and provide commanders with the tools they need to do it*—e.g., lesson plans, guidelines, unit diagnostic instruments, etc. Also of high importance is to include senior NCO's in any such training and ensure that they are fully onboard with respect to support for, and conduct of, the EO program. It is our impression that, in the past, senior NCO's have frequently been by-passed by the program itself and they tend to view it with feelings ranging from indifference to hostility. Senior NCO's and senior officers are also the groups receiving the least EO training while possessing, as leaders, the greatest power to improve race relations and ensure equality of opportunity and treatment.

New Approach to EO Training

Race relations and equal opportunity education and training in the Army was initiated hurriedly under stressful conditions in response to a crisis situation. Quick fix, *ad hoc*

modifications have been introduced into the program from time to time. However appropriate the implicit training model may have been to the requirements of earlier times, it appears to be substantially inappropriate to today's needs for training. It is one conclusion from this study that a whole new approach to EO education and training should be developed and substituted for the current approach.

The new approach should provide a coherent, overall program which interrelates the training received at entry points, school training at various levels, and unit training. In developing a new approach, efforts should be made to create a program which has the characteristics described below.

Leader Training—Primary emphasis in the program should be to effectively train Army leadership at all levels in awareness of their EO responsibilities and knowledge of how to carry them out.

Job Related—Training at every level should be geared to the jobs of persons at that level.

Sequential Reinforcement—Training received at one level or time should be reinforced and built upon by training at the next level or time.

Method of Instruction Appropriate to Content—Training methods should be related to content. Using small group seminars to impart essentially cognitive and factual information is as inappropriate as attempting experiential learning in a one hundred-person group.

Specific Objectives Clearly Established for Each Course—Each course should have specific, behavioral objectives.

Content Related to Training Objectives—Course content should be scrutinized to ensure that each part is necessary for the achievement of the training objectives.

New Content—New course content at many levels needs to be developed in order to meet new training needs regarding institutional discrimination, the issue of "reverse discrimination," the leader's role and responsibilities in the EO program, and the basic nature of the equal opportunity problem in the Army.

Greater Emphasis on Individual Training—The training program should be more balanced than it has been in that individual training in schools should better prepare students for the EO problems they will encounter in the field.

Elimination of Negative Aspects of Course Content—Course content should be scrutinized to eliminate aspects which tend to produce negative responses from students with no compensating positive effect. Past research has repeatedly found a need to make course content:

- less repetitious
- less black-white oriented
- more relevant to Army life
- less centered on minority history and culture
- more relevant to current unit problems
- less slanted to benefit minorities
- less blaming of whites.

Many such changes could be made without impairing the achievement of training objectives.

EO Training More Closely Tied to Affirmative Actions—The training program should be more explicitly related to and supportive of the Affirmative Actions component of the EO program. Heretofore, the components have been too unrelated and independent of each other.

Integral Feedback and Assessment System—The training program should have a built-in feedback and assessment system which provides a continuous assessment of the extent to which the program objectives are being achieved. Such a system should also be used to sense the need for changes in the program as a function of altered situations or the arising of new needs. This could provide a built-in mechanism for accomplishing adaptive change in the training program.

These would appear to be minimum characteristics one would want to consider in developing a new approach to EO training. Such a new approach would not necessarily lead to an expanded program requiring any greater resources than the present one. One likely outcome is that a more effective program requiring substantially fewer resources than the present program may well be feasible.

Achieving Credibility

The Army EO program suffers from low credibility from minorities because they tend to believe that whites in the Army really do not want minorities to be accorded equal treatment and from whites either because they think the program is merely for show or it is to benefit minorities at the expense of whites. The result is that most Army personnel believe the EO program is cosmetic and does not reflect true Army policy. Such a perception does not enhance the likelihood of EO course material being believed or learned.

One conclusion from this study is that the Army should consider what steps need to be taken to increase the credibility of the EO education and training program. Some of the factors that contribute to low credibility of the program are:

- “Special” character of program; it is perceived as being handled differently from other more “normal” programs.
- Perceived lack of support from the chain of command.
- Perception by commanders that the only aspect of RR/EO that concerns them is “keeping the lid on”—i.e., don’t have a racial incident in your unit.
- Scheduling training that frequently does not actually take place and reporting inflated attendance figures when training does occur.
- Instructors, EOSO’s and EO NCO’s, of low status, sometimes low competence, who inspire little respect as good soldiers.
- Misunderstanding of the objectives and purposes of the program.
- Widespread misinformation with respect to the actual occurrence of discrimination.
- The pervasive belief that RR/EO concerns are not really related to the ability of a unit to perform its primary mission.
- Non-attendance of training by chain-of-command personnel.

A new approach should endeavor to confront each of these issues directly, changing the program where warranted—e.g., eliminating its “special” character—and supplying factual information where needed to contradict the widespread misperceptions of the actual facts concerning equal opportunity in the Army.

Institutionalizing the RR/EO Program

As has been said, the RR/EO program was initiated in response to a crisis situation and has maintained the image of a temporary, special program. In the original crisis period, a special program may have been highly appropriate since the crisis existed because the chain of command, operating under their normal mode, failed to prevent its occurrence. Special action was required. In the long run, however, special programs lose their force when the crisis no longer is perceived to exist. The crisis in race relations in the Army which, at one time, was visible to all in the form of widespread interracial violence, no longer exists. Consequently, the RR/EO program has lost its prominence and its high priority. As a special program, its force has been spent.

However, the problem which the program was designed to address has not disappeared even though its publicly visible manifestations have nearly done so. Racial tensions still persist and equality of opportunity has not been achieved even though substantial progress has been made toward it. There is still a need, then, for a program aimed at achieving this end and, indeed, most Army personnel at all levels in the study recognized that such a need exists even where they did not like or agree with the current program. Under the present circumstances, for such a program to exist and be effective, it must become part of the normal and routine mode of operation in the Army. It must be built in to all practices and procedures through which the Army makes judgments about personnel. Equality of opportunity and interracial harmony need to become the norm in all Army activities.

There is the possibility that to some readers, the conclusion that the EO program needs to be institutionalized could be misunderstood as being tantamount to recommending the elimination of the program. To avoid any such misperceptions, it is emphasized that the exact opposite is true. The ultimate goal of an equal opportunity program must be that

the normal functioning of the organization guarantees equality of opportunity and that no special additional program is required to achieve it. The program will be successfully institutionalized when that goal has been achieved.

V. CONCLUDING COMMENT

From a broad policy perspective, this report has reviewed the major conclusions drawn from the study with respect to program changes the Army may wish to consider. The findings on which they were based as well as more detailed and specific conclusions are found in the six separate reports on which this summary report is based.

The Army's RR/EO training and education program, now in existence for over six years, has played a contributing role to improved race relations and greater equality of opportunity in the Army. In its magnitude and its intent, it has been a landmark program and a pioneering struggle in an endeavor with few precedents or guidelines. Currently, however, the education and training program gives evidence of drifting, stagnation, and lessening relevance to the problems it is intended to address. Compared to its earlier vigor, it appears impoverished and undernourished. If it is to achieve its objectives, it requires redirection and revitalization. It needs redevelopment into a form more appropriate to the current and future needs of the Army.